Jan. 9
Description of Northeastern Contra Costa County to 1940
Early History
The Spanish history of the northeastern Contra Costa area began in 1772 when an exploration party from Monterey entered the area. The name “Contra Costa” was given to the general area in 1811 by military surveyors who left the Presidio of San Francisco by boat to chart the contra costa, or opposite shore. In 1821 Mexico gained independence and the Spanish rule of California was ended.

The settlement of the Contra Costa area began in 1823 with the awarding of land grants by the Mexican government. In 1837 one of these grants was purchased by John Marsh, who became the area’s first permanent United States settler.

The war between the United States and Mexico in 1846, which was accompanied by the Bear Flag revolt, brought an end to Mexican rule of California. By terms of the 1848 treaty of Guadalupe hidalgo, the California territory was officially ceded to the United States. In the following year California adopted a state constitution and established a state government. In 1850 California officially attained statehood and the legislature divided California into 27 counties, one of which was Contra Costa. In 1853 the size of Contra Costa County was reduced by nearly one-half, with the southern and western portions becoming part of the newly formed Alameda County.

The 1848 discovery of gold in California precipitated a massive influx of people. As the Contra Costa area was on both the land and water routes between the coastal cities and the gold fields, numerous towns sprang up at the trail crossings and river landings. These towns included Martinez, Pittsburg, Antioch, Pacheco, and Walnut Creek. The established overland trails were later developed in the 1870’s as major railroad routes, and have since been paralleled by highways.

Agricultural Development
During the Mexican era cattle raising was the primary form of economic livelihood. Tens of thousands of livestock roamed the open range and, until the gold rush era, were butchered for their hides, tallow, and horns.
The decline of the cattle empires began in 1847, when a large portion of one rancho was planted in wheat. The gold rush drastically increased the demand for cereal grains and many new settlers preferred farming to cattle raising. By 1858 over 31,000 acres of Contra Costa County were in grains, and this acreage continued to increase. In the 1880’s grain storage warehouses lined Carquinez Strait and ships were queued at the wharfs.
The horticultural development of the county began in 1853 when commercial orchards and vineyards were established in Alhambra Valley, south of Martinez. This success was followed by plantings in Ygnacio, Brionies, San Ramon and other valleys, with pears, apricots, walnuts, and grapes being the principal crops. By 1875 some 80,000 fruit trees and an equivalent acreage of vineyards were being cultivated. In later decades fruit growing gained dominance over grain.
The gold rush also brought a demand for vegetables and other truck crops. Although vegetables were commercially grown in Contra Costa County as early as 1853, it was not until the 1870’s that sizeable truck farms flourished n the Diablo Valley and Delta areas. Asparagus and other truck crops were introduced by 1900, and the Delta subsequently became one of the major vegetable producing areas in the nation.

Jan. 17
Mineral Development
For over 40 years Contra Costa was the leading coal producing county in California. A workable deposit of low grade coal was discovered in 1855 along the Mount Diablo foothills south of Pittsburg and Antioch, and a dozen mines were soon opened. Until production ceased in 1902, due to competition from superior fuels, the total value of coal produced exceeded $20,000,000.
Numerous other minerals were discovered within the county. Minor quantities of copper, gold, silver, mercury, and various paint pigments were mined in the 1800’s. Lime deposits of economic significance were located in the 1850’s, and kilns were soon producing building mortar for use in San Francisco. A cement plant, opened at Cowell in 1908, is still in operation. Lime has also been produced for agricultural purposes. Clay, sand, gravel and stone have also been of economic importance.

The search for oil in northeastern Contra Costa County began in 1864, but no oil was produced. The Rio Vista natural gas field was discovered in 1936 and shortly thereafter producing wells were drilled in the extreme northeastern tip of the county. In recent years both oil and gas wells have been in production in the Brentwood area.

Several mineral springs in northeastern Contra Costa County have been commercially developed at various times, either as spas or for bottled water.

Jan. 23
Industrial Development
The growth of commerce and agriculture in the Contra Costa area following the 1849 gold rush was accompanied by the establishment of numerous local industries. Only a few of these were of lasting importance.

The oldest major industry in the area is the F.E. Booth Canning Company at Pittsburg. This company was established in 1875 as a fish cannery, but now cans more asparagus and other vegetables than fish.
In 1884 flour mills were opened in Crockett. These mills were converted in 1897 to refine sugar beets, and in 1905 were sold to a cane sugar refining company which subsequently became the California and Hawaiian Sugar Corporation, Crockett’s largest industry.

The petroleum refining industry in the Martinez area developed following the completion in 1908 of the Associated Pipe Line Company’s 300-mile pipeline from the Bakersfield oilfields to the harbors at Port Costa and Avon. By 1913 this company was operating a refinery at Avon, and in 1926 the Tidewater-Associated Oil Company was formed. The Shell Oil Company of California began construction on a $5,000,000 refinery at Martinez in 1914, the site being chosen because of its excellent shipping and rail transportation facilities, and soon thereafter completed its own 176-mile pipeline form the Coalinga oil fields.

The present industrialization of the Pittsburg-Antioch area is the result of the foresight of C.A. Hooper, who in 1900 purchased at auction 8,858 acres of land originally in a Mexican rancho. Realizing the excellence of the ocean, river and rail transportation facilities and the availability of nearby markets and raw materials, Hooper began promoting the property as industrial sites. In 1903 he founded the Redwood Manufacturing Association, for the manufacture of wood products and for wholesaling lumber.

In 1903 Hooper also induced the Columbia Steel Company to establish a steel mill at Pittsburg. In 1929 a tin plate mill was erected at a cost of $3,000,000, the first such mill to be built west of Saint Louis, Missouri. In 1930, Columbia Steel was purchased by the United States Steel Corporation.

In 1906 the Pioneer Rubber Mills, founded in 1888, moved to Pittsburg where harbor facilities made it possible to receive raw materials direct from the South Seas and the transcontinental railroads provided an easy means of product distribution.

The General Chemical Company, later a subsidiary of the Allied Chemical and Dye Corporation, in 1909 established a plant at Nichols, west of Pittsburg, for the manufacture of acids and heavy chemicals. In 1916 the Great Western Electro-Chemical Company was established at Pittsburg for production of industrial chemicals by electrolytic processes. In 1938-39 this company merged with the Dow Chemical Company.
In subsequent years important manufacturing plants were established in the Pittsburg area by the Johns-Manville Co., the Shell Chemical Co., and the Stockton Fire Brick Co. In each instance, the availability of ocean and rail transportation facilities was a major location factor.

It is significant that the availability of fresh water in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Rivers and in Suisun Bay was a comparatively minor consideration in the decisions to locate these industries in the Pittsburg area.

Jan. 30
Water Resources and Water Development in Northeastern Contra Costa County, to 1940
Climate
The climate of north-central Contra Costa County is similar to that of the San Francisco Bay area, being subject to the same moderating influence of the Pacific Ocean.
During the period of 1848 to 1940, the northeastern Contra Costa area endured eleven seasons of excessive precipitation and 27 seasons of drought. Disastrous floods occurred in 1861-62, 1889-90, 1894-95, 1910-11, and 1913-14. The most severe of the droughts occurred in 1862-65, 1871, 1883, and 1898-99. Irrigation of crops is said to have started during the 1862-65 drought, and the 1898-99 drought gave impetus to large-scale irrigation projects throughout California.

Surface, Ground, and Imported Water
The surface water resources of northeastern Contra Costa County have always been limited. During years of normal precipitation fresh water flowed in the peripheral channels and sloughs of Suisun Bay, the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers, and Old River, but in years of drought these waters became saline. Streamflow within the county was confined almost entirely to the rainy season, with less than three percent of the annual flow occurring during June through November. The total annual flow was also small, with that from the entire Mount Diablo Creek Group averaging less than 70,000 af. Thus, the inland areas were essentially devoid of surface water resources.

Ground water in the northeastern portion of the county occurred principally in the Pittsburg Plain, the Ygnacio Valley, and the Clayton Valley. Only meager, highly mineralized ground water supplies existed in the area south and east of Antioch and Oakley.

In the Pittsburg Plain, a region two miles wide by twelve miles long located on the river front in the Pittsburg-Antioch area, ground water sources were extensively used in the 1920’s and 1930’s, and the resulting overdraft permitted brackish tidal waters to intrude into the aquifers. The quality of these ground waters then became rather poor, with chlorides ranging from 100 to 500 ppm and total dissolved solids of 1,000 to 2,000 ppm.

Until the Contra Costa Canal began partial operation in 1940, the only water importation system in northeastern Contra Costa County was the Mokelumne River Aqueduct of the East Bay Municipal Utility District. This pipeline started at Pardee Reservoir on the Mokelumne River about 30 miles northeast of Stockton, California, entered Contra Costa County east of Brentwood, paralleled the San Joaquin River approximately one to two miles inland between Antioch and Port Chicago, cut diagonally across Ygnacio Valley, and terminated at Lafayette Reservoir.

The Mokelumne River Aqueduct began delivering water to the San Leandro-Oakland-Berkeley-Richmond area in 1929, but water service was normally provided only within the Utility District. In emergency situations, however, aqueduct water was temporarily made available in northeastern Contra Costa County. For instance, in 1939 aqueduct water was briefly supplied to Antioch when the city’s San Joaquin River supply became too brackish for domestic use and its municipal reservoir supply was nearly exhausted.

Feb. 6
Industrial Water Development
The industries of northeastern Contra Costa County adjacent to the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers and Suisun Bay, relied heavily on these sources for practically all of their needs until 1917. Thereafter these sources became brackish during longer portions of each year, so the industries were forced to install cooling equipment designed to use saline water. By 1930 the industrial fresh water demand was only about 20 percent of the total industrial water use.

For economic reasons, the industries pumped process waters from the rivers and the bay whenever these sources were sufficiently fresh. During the remaining periods fresh water was obtained from ground water and public utility sources. By 1930 only about 20 percent of the industrial fresh water, or about 4 percent of the total industrial water demand, was obtained from river or bay sources.

The northeastern Contra Costa industries which were located too far inland to use surface water at first relied on ground water and public utility sources. By the late 1920’s and the 1930’s, the increased demand on ground water sources cause saline water to enter the aquifers and many industrial wells became too brackish to be used. These industries then had to obtain their water supplies entirely from public utilities.

The extensive intrusion of saline water into both surface and ground sources substantially increased industrial fresh water costs. Fresh water could, when available, be pumped from the rivers of the bay for about $3.90 per af, whereas water from the public utilities ranged in cost from $76 per af for large users to $152 per af for small users, and even to a high of $303 per af. In the 1920’s and 1930’s, the industries in the Pittsburg-Antioch area, being heavy users of fresh water, thus became increasingly interested in proposals for providing reliable supplies of fresh water at reduced cost.

Feb. 16
Agricultural Water Development
Irrigation was not practiced in the Ygnacio and Clayton Valleys in the early 1900’s. In years of normal rainfall, and with the comparatively shallow depth to ground water, orchard and other crops were grown without supplemental water. The first irrigation well was reportedly sunk in 1912 for a 50-acre walnut orchard. In the 1920’s and 1930’s, due primarily to extensive withdrawals of ground water for industrial and domestic uses, the water table was lowered far below the root zone and irrigation became more desirable.
In the early 1930’s the lands south of the San Joaquin River between Antioch and Oakley were practically all dry farmed. A few small orchards and vineyards were irrigated from wells, but the scarcity of ground water and the distance from surface sources prevented greater irrigation development.

Although the first irrigation district law in California was adopted in 1872, the irrigation district movement had its practical inception in 1887 when the legislature passed the Wright Act. Districts were so easily organized under the Act that numerous marginal irrigation projects were undertaken. The subsequent failure of many of these projects was due to speculation, inadequate engineering, and poor management. Of the $8,271,750 in bonds issued under this Act, only about fifty percent was recovered by the bond holders.

In 1897 the California legislature attempted to remedy this situation by repealing the Wright Act and passing the Bridgeford Act. The provisions of this Act were so restrictive that no new irrigation districts were organized during the following twelve years.

The Bridgeford Act was slightly revised in 1917 so that districts could be more readily formed. The revised act became known as the California Irrigation District Act. During the period from 1915 to 1930, irrigation districts became successful and accepted institutions. Some seventy-five districts were organized during this period, including the Byron-Bethany and the East Contra Costa irrigation districts in southeastern Contra Costa County.

Feb. 21
Industrial Water Development
The industries of northeastern Contra Costa County adjacent to the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers and Suisun Bay, relied heavily on these sources for practically all of their needs until 1917. Thereafter these sources became brackish during longer portions of each year, so the industries were forced to install cooling equipment designed to use saline water. By 1930 the industrial fresh water demand was only about 20 percent of the total industrial water use.

For economic reasons, the industries pumped process waters from the rivers and the bay whenever these sources were sufficiently fresh. During the remaining periods fresh water was obtained from ground water and public utility sources. By 1930 only about 20 percent of the industrial fresh water, or about 4 percent of the total industrial water demand, was obtained from river or bay sources.

The northeastern Contra Costa industries which were located too far inland to use surface water at first relied on ground water and public utility sources. By the late 1920’s and the 1930’s, the increased demand on ground water sources cause saline water to enter the aquifers and many industrial wells became too brackish to be used. These industries then had to obtain their water supplies entirely from public utilities.

The extensive intrusion of saline water into both surface and ground sources substantially increased industrial fresh water costs. Fresh water could, when available, be pumped from the rivers of the bay for about $3.90 per af, whereas water from the public utilities ranged in cost from $76 per af for large users to $152 per af for small users, and even to a high of $303 per af. In the 1920’s and 1930’s, the industries in the Pittsburg-Antioch area, being heavy users of fresh water, thus became increasingly interested in proposals for providing reliable supplies of fresh water at reduced cost.

Feb. 27
Development of the Salt Water Problem
If there were no flow in the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers, the salt water of the Pacific Ocean would ebb and flow through the bays, Delta water courses, and river channels to the vicinity of Sacramento and Stockton. Under normal conditions the fresh water discharge of these rivers mixes with the saline ocean water, resulting in a gradual upstream reduction of salinity concentration. The location of water of a given salinity thus depends on the magnitude of fresh water discharge and the stage of the tide.

The natural flow in the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers varies with the annual precipitation and the season. During the period from 1871 to 1929, the combined annual flow through the Delta ranged from 80,000,000 af to 6,000,000 af, averaging about 31,000,000 af. Over 80 percent of the annual flow usually occurred during the six-month period form January to June.

Prior to 1917, the average fresh water discharge prevented salt water from intruding into the Delta. In drought years, salt water penetrated into Delta channels. Salinity problems occurred at and above Antioch in 1841, the 1860’s, the 1870’s, and during the late summer months in the early 1900’s. Studies indicated that river water in the Antioch-Collinsville vicinity had reached a salinity of at least 100 ppm of chloride in every year, so Antioch, near the confluence of the two rivers, was designated as the normal limit of salt water intrusion.

Irrigation in the Central Valley increased rapidly after 1910, with considerable water being used for rice cultivation after 1916. The demand for irrigation water was greatest from May through August, and caused significant reductions of fresh water discharges.

After 1917, a combination of less-than-normal precipitation, increased irrigation diversions, and greater upstream reservoir storage, permitted salt water to intrude into the Delta earlier, farther, and in greater concentrations than had previously been known. From 1920 through 1940 a salinity of 1000 ppm of chloride, considered the upper limit for irrigation water, occurred above Antioch in every year except 1938. This salinity existed in about 20 percent of the Delta in 1920, 50 percent in 1924, and 70 percent in 1931.

The maximum salinity advance almost always occurred during September and penetrated further in the San Joaquin Delta than in the Sacramento Delta. The saline water would usually be flushed from the Delta by late December, but pockets of saline water often remained in the San Joaquin Delta long after the Sacramento Delta became fresh.

In addition to affecting the municipal, industrial, and irrigation water users, yet another salinity problem arose. Beginning in 1917, infestations of the marine borer, or shipworm, occurred in and above Suisun Bay. By 1921 all untreated timber piling supporting waterfront structures had been destroyed, resulting in damages of at least $25,000,000. Replacement piles of untreated timber often lasted less than one year, so creosoted or concrete-jacketed piling had to be used ─at roughly twice the cost.

The re-establishment of historic fresh water conditions thus became a cause common to the municipalities and industries in north eastern Contra Costa County, and to the agriculturalists in the Delta area.

March 6
Local Reaction to the Salt Water Problem
By 1920 it was apparent that salinity problems in the Contra Costa and Delta areas would become severe as upstream storage and diversions increased. Meetings between Delta and upper Sacramento water users were held, but the upstream users could not be persuaded to reduce their diversions.

In 1920 Antioch, with the support of Delta landowners, applied for a temporary injunction prohibiting certain upper Sacramento irrigators from reducing the flow past Sacramento below 3,500 cfs, the flow believed necessary to prevent salt water intrusion in the Delta. The injunction was granted, but the California Supreme Court reversed the decision. The Court held that Antioch did not have a riparian right, and that appropriators near the ocean outlet of a river could not require subsequent upstream appropriators to leave sufficient flow to prevent tidal salinity encroachment.

Following the “Antioch” defeat, a group of 143 Delta landowners filed a suit claiming their own riparian right to fresh water. This action named nearly 500 defendants upstream on both the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers, and involved almost every aspect of California water law. Rather than bring the suit to trial, the Court held it in abeyance until it could be determined if the problem could be solved by engineering works.

The legal battles focused state-wide attention on the salinity problem. In addition, numerous applications were made to the California Division of Water Rights for permits to use Sacramento River water. It was evident to State authorities that a complete investigation was needed, so a data collection program was begun. The Division, in conjunction with the Sacramento Chamber of Commerce, also held a public Sacramento River Problems Conference in January 1924.

At this conference it was suggested that a dam acting as a salt water barrier across the river outlet in the Richmond-Antioch area might be the most feasible means of solving the salinity problem. The barrier would prevent salinity incursions in the Delta, and would provide a fresh water reservoir which could be used by the municipalities and industries in Contra Costa and Solano Counties. This concept was not new, as similar proposals had been made in the 1860’s, in 1880, and during the 1920 “Antioch” suit. It had also been considered by the Army Corps of Engineers.

In 1924, the U.S. Department of the Interior, the California Department of Public Works, and the Sacramento Valley Development Association agreed to finance the Bureau of Reclamation in an investigation of the proposed Iron Canyon Project on the upper Sacramento River and possible control works on the lower portion of the river, including a determination of the feasibility, effectiveness, and cost of various salt water barriers.

The Bureau study was completed in 1927 and published in 1929. Included were detailed investigations of barrier locations and designs, tides, floods, navigation, storage salinity, silt, and water required for operation. The study concluded that although a barrier was physically feasible and would solve the salinity problem, it could be built only at great cost and releases from proposed multiple-purpose mountain reservoirs could temporarily achieve the same result at a lower cost.

March 13
The Salt Water Barrier Association
In 1924, C.W. Schedler, General Manager of the Great Western Electro-Chemical Company, began to speak in public on the industrial aspects of the salt water problem and to advocate a salt water barrier. In the following year he organized and became Chairman of the Association of Industrial Water Users of Contra Costa and Solano Counties (AIWU).

To promote the salt water barrier concept, the AIWU in 1928 hired T.H. Means, a prominent San Francisco consulting engineer, to study the feasibility of such a structure. In preparing his report, Means had full access to the Bureau’s studies - even though they were not yet public property. His report concluded that a barrier at Army Point was economically feasible, provided railroad and automobile traffic paid part of the cost, and that it would cost less than the Iron Canyon Reservoir proposed by the Bureau. The AIWU then engaged Means to explain the importance of the barrier before various committees of the California Legislature.

The AIWU considered a publicity campaign for the barrier, but felt this was politically unwise. The stigma of special-interest pressure could easily ruin the chances of the entire concept. However, when a Legislative Committee in January 1929 recommended against immediate construction of the barrier, the AIWU reversed its decision.

Rather than become overly involved in a publicity campaign, the AIWU induced non-industrial interests to organize a Bay Barrier Association (BBA). The BBA then engaged Attorney T. M. Carlson to lobby in the 1929 Legislature on behalf of a salt water barrier. After the Senate adopted the barrier plan and the Assembly narrowly defeated it, dissension arose within the BBA and it ceased to function.
Several members of the BBA realized that the work of the BBA should be continued. It was then reorganized in October 1929 with Schedler as President, L.E. Mullen, a Martinez realtor, as Secretary, and Carlson as Attorney. A general publicity campaign was then begun, and meetings were held throughout the Bay region.

The new BBA was so effective that, in late 1929, a full-time staff was hired and a San Francisco office was opened. In early 1930 the name was changed to Salt Water Barrier Association (SWBA), and it was incorporated as a non-profit organization.

In late 1930 the SWBA became aware that a report being prepared by the Army Corps of Engineers would recommend against a barrier. The SWBA and the AIWU also knew that the State Engineer was developing the concept of a canal from the Delta to provide substitute water to the northeastern Contra Costa area. The AIWU was intrigued by this possibility and switched its support to the canal.

The SWBA did not concede defeat, as another engineer consulted by it did not agree with the Corps’ report. Thus, Carlson was again engaged to represent the SWBA before the 1931 Legislature. However, the Governor wished to treat the Delta water problem in the context of a wider perspective and in May 1931 he appointed a special committee to formulate plans for conserving water in the entire State, including relief to the Contra Costa area by the proposed canal.

Thus the activities of the SWBA also shifted to maintaining the Legislature’s awareness of Contra Costa County’s water needs, and to actively promoting the proposed canal.

March 20
California’s State Water Project
Water resource planning and development in California had been performed at the local level ever since the Spanish missionaries first diverted irrigation water from the San Diego River in 1770. Comprehensive water resource planning at the State level was initiated as a result of the severe drought of 1916-20.

A plan consisting of major upstream impounding reservoirs and large canals to convey water throughout the Central Valley and to the San Francisco and Los Angeles areas was proposed in 1920 by R.B. Marshall of the U.S. Geological Survey. Attempts were made to adopt a State Constitutional Amendment, known as “The Water and Power Act,” which included authorization of this plan, but the proposal was defeated in 1922, 1924, and again in 1926. These defeats were generally credited to the efforts of the public utilities, principally the Pacific Gas and Electric Company, which opposed the power provision of the Act.

Comprehensive water resource plans were presented to the Legislature by the California Division of Engineering and Irrigation in 1923 and 1927. The latter plan included Kennett (Shasta) and four other dams in the Sacramento Valley, diversion of Trinity River water to the Sacramento Valley, four dams and main conveyance canals in the San Joaquin Valley, and power production at the major dams. A salt water barrier was not included, as salinity control was to be attained through controlled release of reservoir waters. The 1927 plan was generally approved, but not adopted, by the Legislatures of 1927 and 1929.
A revised report on the State Water Plan was then prepared in 1930 and submitted to the Legislature in 1931. The following units of the Plan were proposed for immediate development: Kennett (Shasta) and Friant reservoirs, the San Joaquin River - Kern County (Friant-Kern) canal, the Madera canal, the Magunden-Edison (Delta-Mendota Canal) pumping system, and the Contra Costa County conduit. Salinity control through reservoir releases was again recommended.

The report briefly described the proposed Contra Costa County conduit. Both irrigation and industrial water would be provided. The conduit would begin at Rock Slough in the Delta, have a diversion capacity of 120 cfs and periodic pump lifts, and extend westerly as an open channel for about 50 miles into the Clayton and Ygnacio Valleys. A branch pipeline would also extend from the conduit to serve industries in the Martinez area. The total cost was estimated to by $2,500,000 and, for an annual delivery of 43,500 af, the unit cost would be $6.90 per af.

The Joint Legislative Water Problems Committee of 1931 generally endorsed the Plan, including the use of fresh water for salinity control, and recommended that the Plan units proposed for immediate development be constructed as soon as possible. Thus, the State Water Plan congealed into a proposal for the immediate development of Central Valley water resources.

In 1933, a bill was enacted by the Legislature authorizing construction of the Central Valley Project. It is reported that this bill was drafted by Attorneys T. M . Carlson of Richmond and J. Burke of Visalia. One of the primary purposes of Kennett Dam, the first authorized unit, was stated to be salinity control, and the second authorized unit was the Contra Costa Conduit. This Act was bitterly contested, but it was ratified in a special state-wide referendum. The principal opponents were again the public utilities, headed by the Pacific Gas and Electric Company.

March 27
Federal Assumption of the Central Valley Project
Although California had a Central Valley Project Act, it was far from having a Central Valley Project. The Act authorized the issuance of $170,000,000 in revenue bonds, but due to the national economic depression, it was claimed that the bonds could not be sold. In fact, no effort was made to sell the bonds.

It was known as early as 1930 that California probably could not finance its State Water Plan. In fact, a joint Federal-State Commission on Water Resources had recommended in 1930 that the project be constructed by the Federal government and operated by the State. A 1931 preliminary Bureau of Reclamation study concluded that the project should be assigned to the Bureau. The California Water Resource Commission reported in 1932 that every effort should be made to obtain Federal financial aid of the project.

In 1933, just prior to the Central Valley Project Act referendum, the State filed a grant and loan application with the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works. The voters were then told that the Project would be financed by Federal contributions and by Federal purchase of the revenue bonds. One State official even declared that the Project would be financed without obligation to the State. However, no final action was taken by the Federal agency.

To promote the granting of Federal aid, a group of State officials and citizens spent the first half of 1934 in Washington, D.C. Although no immediate Federal assistance was obtained, considerable good will toward the Project was created. It is reported that Attorney Carlson convinced President Roosevelt of the Project’s value during a 20-minute personal presentation.

State efforts to obtain Federal financing continued throughout 1934 and 1935. During one Congressional hearing the State Engineer venturedthat if the Federal Government desired to take charge of the Project, the people of California would willingly agree.

The first Federal authorizations for the Project were obtained in 1935. The Rivers and Harbors Act authorized $12,000,000 toward Shasta Dam, based on navigation and flood control benefits, but no funds were appropriated. The Bureau had applied for $20,000,000 to construct the Project under the Emergency Relieve Appropriation Act, and this was approved by executive order in September. Project expenditures were to be repaid in accordance with reclamation law, but reclamation project status was not granted.

Although the executive order listed the Project units which could be built, the Contra Costa Conduit was an alternative - not a commitment. In an effort to earmark funds for the Conduit, Carlson again conferred with Washington officials. Then, in November 1935, a new executive order was issued stating the work was to begin on all initial Project units, specifically including the Conduit.
The Bureau established a Project office in Sacramento in October 1935, and field surveys were begun in November. The Secretary of the Interior declared the Project to be feasible, and recommended that it be constructed as a Federal reclamation project. The Conduit was included as the second listed unit. The Project was officially adopted as a Federal undertaking on December 2, 1935, when the President approved the finding of feasibility.

The first Congressional appropriation for the Project was made in 1936. The Project was then reauthorized in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1937 and made subject to reclamation law, but still was not given reclamation project status, which would have given it the right of eminent domain in land acquisition. Project funds were again appropriated in 1938 and in every year thereafter.

April 3
Development of the Contra Costa Canal Project
Formation of the Contra Costa County Water District
Although the Contra Costa Conduit had been designated as an initial unit of the Central Valley Project and the Salt Water Barrier Association (SWBA) continued to support the conduit concept, the northeastern Contra Costa industries and municipalities were not sure when it would be built. Local consideration thus continued to be given to plans, some of which had been advanced for over a decade, for quickly obtaining sufficient amounts of adequate quality water.

In 1932, Pittsburg negotiated with the East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD) for water service from the Mokelumne River Aqueduct, but decided that the costs were too great.

Pittsburg, in conjunction with Martinez, Concord and Walnut Creek, then investigated other means of obtaining Mokelumne River water, but was forced to drop the plan when it was opposed by the EBMUD.

The California Water Service Company offered its service to Pittsburg in 1932, 1933, and 1935.

The construction of a local reservoir similar to Antioch’s was proposed in 1933 by consulting engineers E. L. O’Hare of Antioch and C.C. Kennedy of Oakland, and A. Kempkey of San Francisco. This was also proposed by the Pittsburg Industrial Association (PIA) in 1935. Adoption of the O’Hare-Kennedy plan was then advocated by the Pittsburg Citizens Water Committee and the Pittsburg Kiwanis Club. These organizations also proposed the formation of a Greater Pittsburg Water District, and prepared an application for Federal financial assistance.

Although Federal funds for the Contra Costa Conduit were allocated in September 1935, proponents of the O’Hare-Kennedy plan argued that the Conduit could not be in service earlier than 1942, and that even then a reservoir would be needed for effective operation. The PIA did not oppose this plan, but believed that it should be reviewed by an impartial engineer. If it was determined that the plan was feasible, and would provide water at a price industry could afford, the PIA would not oppose formation of the Greater Pittsburg Water District.

April 11
Finding a way to build the Contra Costa Conduit
Attempts to obtain an independent review were stymied when O’Hare and Kennedy refused to submit their data. This problem was surmounted by hiring Kempkey to make a new study of all feasible reservoir projects. Kempkey’s March 1936 report recommended a reservoir on Kellogg Creek filled through a pipeline from Indian Slough.

This project would cost $1,773,000, and would supply raw water to the local industries and treated water to Pittsburg. However, the industries balked at the unit water cost of $18 to $24 per af, and publicly rejected this plan in favor of the Conduit.

Despite municipal and industrial interest in the reservoir plans, the SWBA continued its efforts on behalf of the Conduit. Realizing that a public district would be required to contract for Conduit water, the SWBA in January 1935 prepared a draft of a proposed district organization. Public meetings were held to discuss the situation, and two citizens committees were appointed to finalize the draft.

Meetings were also held with State officials, and local newspaper support was obtained.

The local farmers were not indifferent to the various water plans, as only the Conduit would provide
irrigation. However, the principal interest was shown by the farmers who were already irrigating high-value tree and vine crops with well water.

To explain the proposed district to the farmers, Schedler arranged for the Concord Chamber of Commerce and the Contra Costa County Farm Bureau to sponsor a public meeting in November 1935. At this meeting it was stated that the district would be organized under the County Water District Act of 1913, and would have five directors. The boundaries were to extend westerly from the Brentwood and Bethany irrigation districts along roughly the 100 foot elevation contour to Port Chicago, and then extend south to Walnut Creek and west to Martinez.

Although the Conduit had been promoted principally by the industries, and Schedler had often referred to it as “the industrial canal,” different tactics were used at this meeting. Schedler declared that it was principally an agricultural project, that the industries and municipalities would use only 15 to 20 percent of the water provided, and that, if the farmers did not want the project, the industries would build their own pipelineata cost of only $375,000.

A Bureau of Reclamation representative also stated that the project was in the hands of the farmers, and that if they did not want it the industries could construct their own facilities and the Conduit probably would not be built.

April 17
Making the Money Work
The farmers were quite concerned about the prospective cost of water. Anthony Crafton, a prominent local farmer, believed that water would cost at least $15 per af, instead of $6.90 per af as earlier estimated by the State, and that most farmers could not afford the higher price. Another farmer stated that a large portion of the agricultural areas would become urbanized within a few years, but Schedler replied that residential areas demanded as much water as agricultural regions. A committee of five farmers was then formed to investigate the agricultural costs and to determine which of the farmers should assist the SWBA in forming the proposed district.

Crafton was the most active member of the Farmers Committee. He believed that the farmers would oppose the project unless they were convinced of its desirability and economic soundness. Except for a few orchardists, most farmers were inexperienced in irrigation and not equipped for it. Furthermore, the farmers seemed to fear the district concept, undoubtedly recalling the economic failure of many early irrigation districts. Crafton thus realized that an education program was needed.

The Conduit situation also posed a dilemma for the Bureau. Political efforts, primarily by Attorney Carlson, had caused the President and the Secretary of the Interior to order that the Conduit be built. Yet, the Bureau’s primary function was the reclamation of arid lands. Although it was authorized to deliver water for purposes other than irrigation, municipal and industrial deliveries could not be detrimental to the irrigation function. Thus, according to law, the primary purpose of the Conduit had to be irrigation. The Bureau was, therefore, quite anxious that the farmers take an active interest in the project.

In December 1935, after meetings with representatives of the State Engineer and the Bureau, the Farmers Committee announced that it was satisfied that the water district should be formed. An office was opened in Concord to disseminate information, and petitions for the district, prepared by Attorney Carlson, were circulated throughout the proposed service area. A ten-page information pamphlet was distributed to every voter and landowner in the area, and the Committee personally visited as many farmers as possible.

In promoting the project, the Farmers Committee proclaimed that the following would be attained: (a) a permanent supply of inexpensive water, (b) employment to labor by the expenditure of $2,500,000 in the district, (c) many new industries in the county, (d) a large increase in population, workers and payrolls, (e) more business for merchants, (f) increases in city and county land values, and (g) a final solution to the water shortage among farmers and orchardists.

April 24
Working To Form The Water District

A meeting was held in Pittsburg in February 1936 to promote formation of the district. It was agreed that a second information pamphlet would be issued. As organized labor also lent its support, all concerned agreed that labor should be represented on the district’s Board of Directors. At the insistence of agriculture, it was also agreed that the price of Conduit water would cover operational costs and that the capital costs would be repaid by an ad valorem tax on property. Thus industry was assured of agricultural support for Federal financing, and agriculture was assured that the industries and municipalities (including residential property owners) would pay most of the capital cost.

The County Board of Supervisors held hearings on formation of the district in March 1936. After adjusting the proposed boundaries in accordance with local desires, the Board directed that an election be held on May 5. If the issue carried, a second election to select the directors would thereafter be held. By mutual agreement it was proposed that one of the five directors should represent Martinez labor, one represent the Pittsburg industries, and the remaining three represent the district’s major agricultural areas.

It was known that the law required that each municipality within the proposed district, namely Antioch, Concord, Martinez and Pittsburg, have a majority of its votes favoring the district. Otherwise, even though a majority of votes in the entire district favored formation, the district could not be organized. Although the Pittsburg Chamber of Commerce supported the district, the City continued to seek more immediate sources of water.

Opposition to the district appeared strongest in the Concord area. Anonymous full-page newspaper advertisements argued against the powers of the district and urged a negative vote. The Farmers Committee countered with its own advertisement, consisting of a logical presentation of facts, and campaigned for the district, but doubted that the issue would carry.

May 1
The District is Formed

Public meetings were held almost daily to promote the district, and most local newspapers editorialized in the project’s behalf. It was emphasized that abundant quantities of high-quality water would be provided at reasonable cost, and that Federal assistance and interest-free loans probably would not be available in the future.

A final public meeting was held on the eve of the election, and it was declared that water for all users would cost between $4 and $6.90 per af and that any tax upon land would not exceed seven cents.
The election was held on May 5, 1936, as scheduled. The total vote was 8,932 for and 1,068 opposed, with 67 percent of the eligible voters having participated.

In Ygnacio Valley the vote was 10 to 1 and even in Concord it was 3 to 1 in favor. According to Crafton, “The farmers simply went to that town in a body, and camped in the banks and stores, and put on a house to house canvass of the entire town.”

Formation of the Contra Costa County Water District was then authorized by the County Board of Supervisors on May 8, 1936.

The election for the District’s five-member Board of Directors was set for July 17, 1936. The Contra Costa Conduit Association, which had been organized by District supporters prior to the election, actively campaigned for a single slate of candidates. The Association announced that it had adopted a platform for its candidates so that promises made prior to the election could be kept. It also promised that water would be sold at cost, with the same rate being charged to all users.

Although nine candidates registered for the election, the five Association candidates were elected. These were, in order of votes received: R.D. Bollman, Concord dairyman and Clayton Valley rancher; O.N. Christianson, Pittsburg industrialist; J.E. Taylor, Oakley rancher; A. Crafton, Ygnacio Valley farmer; and J.E. Holmblad, Martinez painter.

One of the Board’s first acts was to appoint T.M Carlson as attorney for the District.

May 8
Canal Design Underway

Preliminary plans for the Contra Costa Conduit were prepared by the State Engineer in 1929-30, and were presented in the 1930 report on the State Water Plan. The conduit concept was included in the State’s Central Valley Project Act of 1933, which also authorized a Water Project Authority (WPA) to implement the Act. Further State studies were made in 1935 and all data were given to the Bureau in 1936.

The design of the Conduit depended primarily on its capacity and elevation. The original State plan called for an initial capacity of 120 cfs. This would have met urgent industrial and municipal needs for ten years and, even though there was then no particular demand for it, would also have provided 86 cfs of irrigation water.

The Bureau, which had established its Central Valley Project (CVP) office at Sacramento in October 1935 and its Conduit office at Antioch in 1936, believed this capacity to be inadequate. It is not known who first advocated a capacity of from 200 to 275 cfs, but such an enlargement was certain to affect both location and design. In March 1936 the State Engineer decided that the Conduit’s capacity should be within this range. He reasoned that the more favorable method of financing -interest-free funds with repayment spread over 40 years - permitted designing for 30-year demands. The Bureau’s Chief Engineer, on being advised that the 275 cfs capacity approximated full development, then authorized its use.

The Farmers Committee at first believed that the cost of the larger Conduit would be prohibitive, but soon reversed itself and favored both the larger capacity and a higher elevation. The latter would increase the area of agricultural land that could be served.

It soon became apparent that more effective CVP cooperation was needed between the Bureau and the State. An agreement was made in March 1936, with a supplemental agreement in March 1937, whereby the State WPA would determine the general location, type, and capacity of all CVP facilities (subject to approval by the Secretary of the Interior), and the Bureau would have design and construction responsibility. The WPA then had a study of the Conduit’s municipal and industrial needs made by G.W.
Dowrie, who had earlier made an industrial survey for the State’s salt water barrier studies. This report concluded that 66 cfs would be sufficient until 1966.

May 15
Canal Design and Construction

The details of Conduit location and design, including width, slope and velocity of flow, were left almost entirely to the judgment of O.G. Boden, the Bureau’s Resident Engineer.

The Chief Engineer’s office usually accepted Boden’s estimates, but strongly favored proposals for reducing annual operation costs at the expense of higher initial costs. It had also favored the capacity increase from 200 to 275 cfs, as the 37.5 percent increase could be achieved at a cost increase of only 12 percent.

The District’s newly organized Board of Directors in August 1936 agreed that the original 120 cfs capacity was inadequate, but believed that cost limitations should determine the Conduit’s size. The Board decided that it could not incur a financial obligation greater than $4,000,000, which was ten percent of the District’s current assessed valuation. This limit was, in reality, probably established by PIA. The Board also tried to determine its desired Conduit capacity, but having little information of its own, concluded that the Conduit should be as large as possible within the cost limitation.

The Bureau, meanwhile, had begun to question the 275 cfs capacity, believing that 300 or even 325 cfs would provide better long-term service. In November 1936, Boden recommended that the initial capacity be increased to 350 cfs. This capacity was quickly approved by the Chief Engineer, mainly because it involved little additional cost. It should be noted that this reason, involving economies of scale, had been used to justify each of the periodic increases in capacity for 200 to 350 cfs, and would be used many times to justify other decisions.

Initial Conduit rights-of-way were appraised in January 1937, and negotiations to purchase were begun. Considerable opposition arose, due to low appraisals and the Bureau’s legal inability to bargain, but most of the land was acquired. The CVP did not have the right of eminent domain, as reclamation project status had not been granted, so some right-of-way could not be obtained. To correct this situation, Attorney Carlson and Bureau attorneys succeeded in having Congress reauthorize the CVP as a reclamation project in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1937. The right of eminent domain was then exercised.

May22
Canal Design and Construction

Contracts for the first four miles of the canal were awarded on June 29, 1937, and Conduit construction was officially begun on October 19. As this initiated construction on the CVP, elaborate ceremonies were held at Oakley on November 7.

Plans for the remaining Conduit sections had not been completed. Although attempts were made to follow the original State plan, the Bureau had decided that alternative designs could be used as long as the objectives were met. In July 1937 the Bureau recommended that the proposed pipeline from Clyde to Martinez be abandoned, and that the Conduit continue as an open canal through the Walnut Creek and Clayton Valleys terminating in a small equalizing reservoir near Martinez. Two small relift pumping plants and canals were also proposed to convey irrigation water at a higher elevation in the Clayton and Ygnacio Valleys, and a third was being considered for the west side of Walnut Creek Valley. The cost of the recommended plan was estimated at $3,635,000.

The WPA finally issued its formal “Report on Capacity and Location of the Contra Costa Conduit” in January 1938. It concurred with the Bureau’s revised Conduit type and location, but omitted the relift systems. Its major conclusion was that the initial capacity should be 275 cfs, with subsequent capacities also being substantially less than the Bureau recommendations.

The WPA report caused consternation within the Bureau. The first four miles of 350 cfs canal were already under construction, and plans and specifications had been prepared for the next eight-mile sections based on this capacity. The Bureau believed the WPA estimates of water usage and conveyance losses were too low, and felt that the 27 percent larger capacity was well worth the 11 percent increase in cost. The Bureau hoped that the WPA would change its position.

May 29
WPA Approves Recommendations on Canal
The District’s Board also favored the larger capacity of the initial sections, and stated that the capacity of the remaining sections, including the relift systems, should be as large as possible provided the cost limit was not exceeded. The Board felt that it must be governed largely by the reaction of the industries, due to their greater financial obligation, and that agricultural interests bight have to be subordinated.

Conduit capacity was discussed at the WPA meetings of March and April 1938, with Attorney Carlson arguing for the Bureau recommendations.

The WPA then approved the Bureau recommendations.

The WPA later tried to regain some control over the CVP, but its effectiveness as an action agency, and even as a coordinating agency, rapidly declined. The last cooperative contract between the Bureau and the WPA expired in 1939 and was not renewed.

It had become apparent that the Contra Costa Canal, the newly adopted and more correct name for the Conduit, could not be completed by late 1938 as the Bureau originally intended. A contract for miles 4 to 12 was awarded in July 1938, and another contract for miles 12 to 20 was awarded later that year. The Bureau then estimated that the first twenty miles of canal would be in service by April 1940, and that the terminal reservoir at Martinez might be completed by early 1942.

It has also become apparent that the total cost would exceed the District’s $4,000,000 limit. As Boden’s August 1938 estimate of $4,796,000 was believed realistic, the Chief Engineer recommended changes, including elimination of the relift canals, reducing the cost to $4,213,800.

The Bureau explained the cost situation to the District’s Board in January 1939. Most of the cost increase was attributed to rising costs of right-of-way, labor, and materials. The Board was asked if it would prefer to raise the allowable cost to $4,500,000 or to eliminate major Canal features. The Board took the matter under advisement, and confidentially requested comments from the industries.

Boden believed that the Board favored the full-scale plan, including the relift canals. As the Pittsburg industries would be served from the first twenty miles of canal already under construction, he also believed that a controversy would develop between agricultural and industrial interests over the total expenditure and the completeness of the system.

The anticipated confrontation occurred in June 1939. At the request of both Martinez and various farmers, the Board drafted a resolution approving the full-scale capacities and features, and authorizing a maximum cost of $4,750,000. Following a heated discussion between industrial and agricultural interests, the resolution was adopted with the understanding that PIA approval was also needed. This approval was given at the conclusion of a special meeting between the Bureau and the industries.

In anticipation of water service, Pittsburg and several industries requested in May 1939 that data be supplied so that lateral connections could be designed. Discussions were thereafter held between the Bureau and the District regarding a contract for temporary water service from the first twenty miles of canal, and an interim contract was agreed to on June 1, 1940.

June 5
Water First Pumped in July, 1940
Due to delays in the delivery of materials, the Bureau was not able to pump water into the first twenty miles of canal until July 8, 1940. On August 18 Pittsburg began using the first water delivered by the CVP. Deliveries to the Columbia Steel Corporation began on September 16, and the first irrigation water was withdrawn on December 9.

The California Water Service Company had indicated in November 1939 that it would probably wish to use Canal water to supplement its own sources. However, the Bureau suspected that the water would be treated and delivered to Martinez and the adjacent industries. It intimated that if these users, who were potential direct users of Canal water, entered into long-term contracts with the Company, the Canal might be shortened or the remaining sections built at a reduced capacity. The Martinez City Council in June 1940 reaffirmed its intent to use Canal water, but the Bureau did not believe this assurance sufficient.

Then, in January 1941, the Martinez electorate authorized bonds for a treatment plant so that Canal water could be utilized.

Several landslides occurred in April 1941 near the end of the projected canal route. This caused both the route and the planned terminal reservoir to be relocated. Meanwhile, the estimated cost of the entire system, including the Ygnacio and Clayton relift canals, was revised in May to $4,670,000.

On December 7, 1941, the United States entered the Second World War. Emergency measures were almost immediately instituted covering materials, manpower, and other commodities. Work on the Canal ceased on May 23, 1942, with about thirty-eight miles completed. Although Congress continued to appropriate funds for Canal construction, the War Production Board repeatedly denied both Bureau and District applications for material priorities. Nevertheless, local pressures caused the Bureau to retain Boden and a small staff throughout the war to continue surveys for the agricultural lateral system. Victory was finally attained in Europe on May 7, 1945, and in the Pacific on August 14.

On October 15, 1945, all restrictions were lifted by the War Production Board and work on the Canal was resumed. Although the status of the Clayton Valley relift canal was uncertain, due to large land acquisition by the Navy’s Port Chicago Storage Area, design data were complete for both relift canals. Bids for these canals, the remaining sections of the main canal, and the terminal reservoir were subsequently awarded.
Canal construction progressed rapidly and, on September 4, 1948, dedication ceremonies were held at the terminal reservoir as water began flowing from canal miles 38. The relift canals were completed in 1948, but Bureau pumps were not yet available. The users temporarily installed their own pumps and service began in January 1949. Final features of the Canal system, including power transmission lines, were completed in June 1951.

The Canal system costs had been greatly inflated by the war. The postwar contract for canal miles 38 to 44 were more than double that of the expired prewar contract. In September 1947 the estimated cost was increased to $6,675,000 or, including the power facilities, to $7,256,000. The system’s final cost was $7,880,000.

When the Canal system was first formulated in the early 1930’s, it was believed that it would cost $2,500,000 and would be completed by 1937. Instead, the system had actually cost over three times as much and had taken about fifteen years longer to complete.

June 12
Improvement of Raw Water Quality
The improvement of raw water quality was, and is, the Canal’s raison d’etre. Adequate quantities of water were always readily available in the Sacramento and San Joaquin River channels. Although the Canal would also provide low-cost irrigation water, it was originally conceived as a solution to the industrial water quality problems in the Pittsburg-Antioch area.

In designing the Canal, the Bureau was more concerned about quantity than quality. It believed that Shasta Reservoir releases would prevent Delta salinity intrusions, and would provide good quality water at the Canal’s Rock Slough intake. In 1939 it tried to ascertain the District’s desired water quality limitation, but the Board could only reply that Rock Slough water could probably be of suitable quality. Thus, the interim contracts avoided giving any water quality guarantees, and stated that the District was not obligated to use water which it believed unsuitable.

Nevertheless, water quality problems arose even before the first water was delivered. The intake was located at the end of Rock Slough, a dead-end arm of the sluggish San Joaquin Delta, and the adjacent ground water was highly saline. Due to the high ground water table, the first four miles of the Canal consisted of unlined open channel ─ which quickly filled with saline water. Although intake flows from pumping plant tests reduced the Canal’s salinity to between 350 and 400 ppm of chloride, or roughly one-half the salinity of Pittsburg’s well supply, that city requested that additional water be pumped to flush the Canal and reduce the salinity at the City’s turnout. The cost of pumping was charged to the District.

Additional salinity problems occurred in early 1941. Analyses showed that the salinity in the unlined section increased from 68 ppm of chloride at the intake to 496 ppm at the lower end. The Canal was again flushed, this time at the expense of the Columbia Steel Co. The Company was quite disturbed about this water quality deterioration, as all preliminary studies had indicated that Canal water would be of Rock Slough quality.

The Bureau believed that heavy rains had raised the ground water level causing saline effluent drainage, and that nothing could be done about it. This saline ground water inflow became a continual problem ─ and a constant reminder of the Bureau’s failure to adequately consider this design aspect.

June 19
More Water Quality Problems

Other water quality problems were also experienced. The low velocity of flow permitted algae, insects, snails, and fish to flourish in the Canal, but these problems diminished somewhat as Canal usage increased. During the spring large quantities of silt would wash into the Delta, causing the Canal water to be highly turbid. These problems rendered the raw water unfit for direct industrial use.

Due to the combined effects of saline ground water drainage and fresh water flow patterns in the Delta, Canal water quality was sometimes inferior to that in the main river in the Pittsburg-Antioch area. Industries which could obtain water from either the Canal or the river used whichever source was more economic, as long as the quality was satisfactory. This situation, although to the user’s advantage, often reduced the Canal flow and perpetuated the poorer quality Canal water available to the other users.

As Canal water was also being used for municipal and domestic purposes, sanitary surveys were made. A 1943 survey revealed that it was common practice in the Delta to dump raw sewage into the channels. Due to tidal action and pumping from Rock Slough, sewage was entering the Canal. Furthermore, numerous surface drains emptied into the Canal, and it was likely that septic tank, cesspool, and barnyard drainage also reached the Canal. By 1949 health problems resulting from individual use of untreated Canal water for drinking and culinary purposes were widespread, and cross-connection of lawn irrigation and municipal supplies was common.

In drafting the proposed long-term water service contract, the Bureau at first included the interim service contract provision wherein the District was the sole judge of Canal water quality acceptability. Upon further consideration it proposed that a quality limit of 250 ppm of chlorides be included, below which water could not be refused on a quality basis. This quality was believed to be that at which industries ceased using river water. This provision was included in the final contract, as executed in September 1951, along with a statement that “The United States assumes no responsibility with respect to the quality of the water to be furnished pursuant to this contract…”

The Bureau’s official attitude toward Canal water quality was expressed in March 1952. Although acknowledging that it had no contractual responsibility in the matter, it stated that the CVP was, to the greatest extent possible, obligated to furnish water not to exceed 250 ppm of chloride. Pumping costs necessary to flush the Canal to maintain this quality would be borne by the CVP. However, if the District wished additional Canal flushing to further improve the quality, the flushing water would be provided at the $10 per af municipal and industrial rate.

June 26
Water Quality is an issue in 1959

The Canal water quality situation became a major issue in 1959. Between July 20 and August 17 water at the Canal intake exceeded 250 ppm of chloride, and during the last week of July it averaged about 375 ppm. As the river water in the Pittsburg-Antioch area had a salinity of 4,000 ppm of chloride, the local industries had to continue using Canal water. However, the poor quality water had detrimental effects on the industries’ products, and at least one industry was forced to close until better quality water became available.

Meetings concerning this situation were held between the Board and Bureau, and it was agreed that additional salinity-control water would be released from Shasta Reservoir. In January 1960 the Bureau admitted that the poor quality of Canal water had been due to Bureau experiments to determine the Shasta Reservoir releases required to provide water of various qualities at the Delta-Mendota Canal and Contra Costa Canal intakes. The Bureau then vowed to operate the CVP in the future so that Canal water would not exceed 250 ppm of chloride.

The Bureau agreed, in April 1960, to undertake preliminary investigation of the Canal water quality problem. The cost would be $10,000, to be divided equally between the Bureau and District.

A meeting was held between Bureau, District, flood control, and soil conservation officials in March 1961. All agencies were trying to coordinate their respective efforts to the public’s best interest. Most of the discussion centered on the joint use of a proposed Los Meganos reservoir on Kellogg Creek. It was believed that the magnitude of this project involved both CVP and national interests.

The Bureau submitted its preliminary findings to the Board in May 1961. The study objective had been to assure a Canal water quality of not greater than 100 ppm of chloride, which roughly corresponded to a maximum total dissolved solids content of 400 ppm. Four alternatives had been considered. The first involved extending the intake via a pipeline and pumping system about ten miles into the Delta to near the mouth of the Mokelumne River. The second would require about fifty miles of conveyance facilities to connect to the proposed Folsom South Canal. The third was a multi-purpose development involving water quality, flood control, and recreation benefits. Good quality water could be pumped form either Italian Slough or the Delta-Mendota Canal intake to a storage reservoir on Kellogg Creek, and then conveyed to the Contra Costa Canal whenever Rock Slough water exceeded 100 ppm of chloride. The fourth involved Los Meganos Reservoir, a much larger carryover storage facility on Kellogg Creek. This reservoir would also provide pumped-storage hydropower and increased recreation benefits.

July 3
Kellogg Creek Reservoir Considered
The third alternative, the smaller reservoir on Kellogg Creek, was believed the most appropriate for Federal adoption. It would satisfactorily meet the local needs, and could later be utilized as part of the Los Meganos scheme. The Bureau indicated that this Kellogg Reservoir facility could be completed in a minimum of four years.

In July 1961 the Board agreed to a cooperative contract with the Bureau whereby each would contribute $50,000 toward the desired feasibility study.

The Board employed an engineering consultant to assist the District in its water quality endeavors. The firm of Leeds, Hill and Jewett of San Francisco was selected. Harvey O. Banks, an officer of the firm and former Director of the California Department of Water Resources, became the District’s consultant.

The Bureau had actively pursued its Kellogg investigations and, by December 1963, had prepared a proposed feasibility report titled “Kellogg Unit, Central Valley Project, California.” This report, which was submitted to the Commissioner for review and released to the District for comment, indicated that the Unit would: provide increased quantities of high quality water to the Canal, provide water to irrigate 8,069 acres of dry-cropped land between the reservoir and the Canal, and contribute to the reliability of the Delta-Mendota Canal system. When high quality water existed in the Delta, ordinary Canal operation would occur and water would also be pumped into Kellogg Reservoir. During periods when Delta water quality was unsatisfactory, the Canal’s pumping system would be shut down and good quality water released from the reservoir to the Canal.

July 10
Lateral Construction only 15 miles
Under Reclamation Law, the Canal’s primary purpose had to be irrigation water supply, even though the principal demand for water came from industries and municipalities. Most local farmers were initially uninterested in the Canal, but a few influential local citizens convinced them that they should at least indicate a desire to use irrigation water. In return for its support, agriculture was given majority representation on the Board of Directors of the newly organized Contra Costa County Water District.

It soon became apparent that the entire Canal could not be sized for the ultimate water demand if the construction cost was to remain within the established limit. Either a drastic reduction of the capacity of remaining unbuilt Canal sections was required, or the cost limit set by the industrial beneficiaries had to be raised. The industries were at first adamant, as the completed Canal sections would easily satisfy their own needs. Nevertheless, the Bureau and the farmers were able to convince the industries that the larger design capacities should be maintained, so the cost limit was raised. No similar reduction in capacity was ever again imposed, as cost restrictions had essentially been abandoned

If the irrigation water provided by the Canal was to be used, some type of lateral distribution system would be required. The District had originally proposed that the farmers build their own laterals, but few were willing or able to do so. The Bureau was not authorized to construct laterals and, in fact, wanted nothing to do with them. This dilemma was resolved in 1940 when Carlson obtained Congressional authorization for CVP lateral construction.

Whereas the Bureau had initially envisioned an extensive lateral system 205 miles in length and costing about $4,087,000 at prewar prices, the actual lateral system had a length of only 15 miles and had cost $1,171,545.

July 17
Paying For The Canal
Despite the fact that Canal and lateral system costs were to be repaid under Reclamation Law contracts, Canal construction had begun and extensive lateral system planning had been undertaken without a repayment contract ever having been discussed.

It had apparently been assumed that an appropriate contract could be executed as soon as the repayment obligation was more accurately known. Besides, the Bureau had essentially been ordered to begin construction as an emergency depression-relief measure, and the District preferred to proceed without a formalized obligation.

Yet the fact remains that the Bureau built the Canal without a repayment contract that would protect the interests of the United States, in full knowledge that later on it would be politically difficult if not impossible to withhold water from the District as a means of forcing contract approval.

The Bureau began serious consideration of CVP repayment contracts during World War II, and by 1946 had decided on a plan of action. Its most significant decision was that the CVP was unsuited to precise cost allocations and to usual repayment procedures, and that satisfactory repayment could be obtained through contracting for water sales only. However, Reclamation Law did not permit title to project facilities to be transferred to project beneficiaries, even if the costs were fully repaid, nor allow users of Bureau water to secure a vested water right. Such a contract was certain to be unpopular with the local people.

When contract negotiations between the Bureau and the District began in 1946, the District’s Board of Directors believed that it could execute a contract under its own interpretation of Reclamation Law.

July 24

Controversy Over Laterals
By 1947 the combined water service and lateral payment contract had become a major issue within the District. The main controversy involved which laterals should be built and who should pay for them. Each locality, and in several instances each farmer, had different opinions. The Board held a series of public meetings to clarify its proposals, but instead intensified the confusion. No strong leaders appeared, and newspaper editorials gave conflicting viewpoints. Thus, most of the people did not know who, or what, to believe.

The Board had always before relied on Carlson to resolve major District issues. But now Carlson was ill and could not render satisfactory assistance. Besides, Carlson kept insisting that the Bureau’s proposed contract was as good as could be obtained, and for once the Board did not agree with him.

Another facet was introduced by a former Bureau employee who claimed he had been fired because he had developed information detrimental to the Bureau’s program. He stated that the proposed lateral system would be a financial burden on the entire District, and that the bureau would be forced to offer a better contract if the current one was rejected. The Bureau patiently denied these allegations, but to no avail. The people preferred to believe the apparent underdog. Much later, long after the damage had been done, it became known that this individual believed he would be reimbursed by the large agricultural organizations for his efforts.

The Bureau did not try to arbitrate or dominate the controversy. Instead, it provided factual information and insisted that the problem be resolved within the District. Nevertheless, it did state that Canal water would continue to be delivered whether the contract was ratified or rejected, thus abandoning the only leverage it had.

When the contract was finally put to a District vote in 1949, it failed to pass by a two-to-one margin with less than 12 percent of the eligible voters participating. The Bureau and the Board were dismayed, but not surprised. Yet, neither had made plans which included this eventuality.
Upon regaining his health, Carlson re-entered the District’s contractual and lateral controversies. He caused a Citizens’ Committee to be formed to study the issues, and managed to have all the diverse major opponents appointed to the Committee. By forcing these individuals to work together toward a common goal, and by acting as their legal adviser, he let them convince themselves that the rejected contract was about the best they could hope to obtain. He also got them to agree on a lateral construction plan for the District which, if not fully satisfactory to all, was at least an acceptable compromise.

The proposed contract encountered no significant opposition. The former major opponents were now proponents, and the large agricultural organizations had agreed to stay out of local issues. Furthermore, the District undertook an extensive publicity campaign to inform the voters of the unanimity on the issues. The contract was ratified n 1951 by a 94 percent affirmative vote, even though the turnout was only about 16 percent, and was then executed.

July 31
Actual Financial Performance

The Canal’s financial performance subsequent to the 1951 execution of the long-term contract has been drastically different from that which had been expected. The rapid urbanization of agricultural land has resulted in significantly lower, and declining, irrigation gross revenue. Irrigation cannot pay even its own operation and maintenance cost, and its actual benefit:cost ratio is now undoubtedly far below unity. Municipal and industrial gross revenue has been correspondingly higher, and will continue to increase. However, continued inflation has increased operation and maintenance costs far beyond expectations, seriously reducing the net revenue available for capital repayment.

It had been anticipated that the municipal and industrial capital costs would be completely repaid at interest within the contract period, and that a significant municipal and industrial revenue contribution would be made toward repayment of interest-free irrigation capital costs. Instead, at a nominal 2.5 percent interest charge, only about 16 percent of the allocable municipal and industrial capital costs will be repaid, and no contribution will be made toward irrigation repayment. As a result, only about 13 percent of the Canal’s total allocable capital cost will be repaid within the contract period.

It must be concluded that the municipal and industrial purpose’s fiscal dilemma is due to the low, fixed contract price for Canal water. In fact, the $10.00 per af price is less than one-fifth of that paid in adjacent areas. This price was originally proposed in 1944 by a Central Valley Project Studies committee as one which was “reasonable” and which the industries would be willing to pay. Although the proposed irrigation water price was subsequently raised to $3.50 per af to cover increased operation and maintenance costs, no similar adjustment was ever made in the price of municipal and industrial water. These prices were included in the long-term contract as the maximum prices that could be charged, even though all operational costs had greatly increased and long-term inflation was certain to increase these costs in the years ahead.

August 7
Remedial measures

In view of the above appraisals, how may the Canal’s fiscal situation be rectified? The long-term contract states that the quantity of CVP water allocated to the District may be adjusted by mutual consent, but does not require that the same price be charged. Therefore, the additional water which the District will soon require should be priced high enough to assure full recovery during the remainder of the existing long-term contract of all Canal allocable capital and operations costs, plus the actual cost of furnishing the additional water. If all Canal water is to be supplied through the Kellogg reservoir project, as seems likely, all Canal capital and operational costs should still be recovered within the existing contract period.
It is also suggested that the prices of additional water be correlated with its quality. Since the Bureau has agreed to try to provide water which will not exceed certain quality limits, and as the water benefit increases with improved quality, it appears reasonable to charge higher prices for better quality water.

There is yet another way out of this fiscal dilemma. The District has, for some time, been advocating transferring the Canal’s operation and maintenance responsibility from the Bureau to the District. If this were done, the full contract water prices would then be available for capital repayment, and the Bureau should insist that the prices not be reduced. Indeed, this possible solution might be the most feasible and equitable way of fulfilling the Canal’s repayment obligation.

An overall evaluation
On an overall basis, has the Contra Costa Canal project been worthwhile? The answer must depend on the viewpoint taken. To the Federal government, the Canal has become a financial burden rather than an asset. However, from the District’s standpoint, the Canal has provided reasonably adequate water service at a local cost which the District could not hope to achieve by any alternate means.
When the District’s existing contract expires in 1991, all issues will have to be renegotiated. Hopefully, the Bureau will never again offer a water service contract with terms as favorable as those the District now enjoys at the expense of the Nation’s taxpayers.

August 14
Recommendations...
This study has shown that the development of a water resource project is a complex process, fraught with compromise. Although the final project must be acceptable to those immediately concerned, it is not necessarily optimized in either economic efficiency or equitability. New analytic techniques are being adapted to the development process, but many inadequate or restrictive procedures are still used. These procedures should be recognized, and specific action taken to improve them.
Analyses of the numerous conclusions concerning the development and performance of the Contra Costa Canal project, presented in discussion form in the preceding chapter, yield the following recommendations which are of importance to existing and future water resource projects.

The significance of bargained decisions should be recognized in efforts to improve project development procedures.
Virtually all important project decisions are made through negotiation. The political process assures that local interests will be well represented in the bargaining process. In many instances the perceived local needs are weighed more heavily than the national interest. To better protect the interests of the Nation’s taxpayers, project justification criteria should be tightened and greater reliance should be placed on analytic optimization techniques.

2. Water quality needs and performance should be fully considered in project development and operation.
Water quality will become increasingly important as greater use and reuse is made of limited water resources. Remedial measures are usually quite costly. The effect of existing and proposed projects on local and regional water qualities should be carefully analyzed.

3. Improved methods should be developed for projecting future project conditions.
The performance of existing projects is greatly affected by the deviation of actual conditions from those which had been projected. Past projections have generally been proven inaccurate. Interdisciplinary research is needed to develop improved methods of projecting land and water use, economic, and other conditions.

4. Initial allowance should be made for uncertainties in future project conditions.
Unforeseen changes in land and water use, or in economic conditions, need not ruin a project’s physical or financial performance. Alternate use patterns should be considered in the original plan. Revised contract procedures, as suggested below, should be implemented.

August 21
Recommendations...

5, Contract water prices should periodically be revised in accordance with prevailing costs and repayment performance.
Fixed or maximum water prices should not be permitted. Prices should be based on (a) actual operation and maintenance expenses, and (b) required capital repayment. Periodic, non-negotiated revisions should be specified in the contract to maintain the project’s financial soundness.

6. Repayment contract for additional project services should recoup any financial deficiencies in existing repayment contracts.
Inadequate financial performance by a project where existing users demand additional water or other services, should be rectified by requiring the supplemental repayment contract to recover existing contract deficits as well as recovering the cost of additional service.

7. The irrigation interest subsidy should be discontinued following termination of irrigation service.
Urbanization of agricultural land may cause irrigation facilities to be abandoned or transferred to municipal and industrial water service before being fully repaid. The remaining capital cost of such facilities should be recovered with interest. Provisions should be included in repayment contracts to cover this eventuality.

8. Reclamation repayment contracts should be approved by an independent, fiscal review agency.
Repayment contracts are negotiated between the Bureau and the local District, and are not reviewed by an outside agency having a national viewpoint. Additional protection should be given the Nation’s taxpayers by requiring that contracts be approved by the Bureau of the Budget, the General Accounting office, or a new Federal Water Resource Review Commission which has status independent of existing agencies.

9. Project costs should periodically be reallocated to individual project units and unit purposes, regardless of the repayment method used.
Periodic determinations should be made of repayment obligations and actual performances so that inequities become known. Improved payment procedures should be devised for future use. Acceptable allocation methods should be developed where equitable methods do not exist.

10. Water prices required to recover costs of project units and unit purposes should periodically be determined by accurate economic analyses.
True unit water costs should periodically e determined and made public, regardless of the prices charged. Congressional approval should be required to price water other than at cost. The subsidy paid or received by each unit and purpose would thus be known.
To be continued…